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Audit Theory Paradigms 
Jack C. Robertson* 
C. T. Zlatkovich Centennial Professor 
University of Texas at Austin 
"Quoth the Professor: 'Well, it may be all right in practice, but it will 
never work in theory' " (Warren E. Buffett, 1985) 
The goal of this paper is to present several candidates for the theory of 
auditing. Herein, there is no pretension to formulate a "new" audit theory, nor 
is there any effort to elevate one expression of theory over another. However, 
toward the end of this paper, a distinction is made between "macrotheory" (a 
global or all-encompassing perspective) and "microtheory" (models for dealing 
with specific decisions) along with an assertion that the two, taken together, 
can be very useful for research and practice. 
The first sections of the paper are an excursion through literature that 
promises some attention to "a theory of auditing.'' A search for such literature 
produces only a few pieces that have such pretensions. The broad conclusion 
from this review is that all the existing expressions of audit theory fall short. 
As the title suggests, this paper deals with "paradigms" that give rise to 
audit theories. A paradigm is taken in the same context as it was in the 
Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance [Committee on Con-
cepts and Standards for External Financial Reports, 1977] as introduced by 
Kuhn [1970] and defined in the plural as "conceptual and instrumental 
frameworks that provide modes from which spring particular coherent tradi-
tions of scientific research.'' In this context, a paradigm is a "world view'' that 
enables researchers, theorists, and practitioners to discern audit phenomena in 
terms of input—specification of the problems of interest, setting—the empirical 
domain over which the audit work/research is applied, and process—the kinds of 
tests and standards used to adjudicate contradictory propositions. A paradigm, 
when shared by all concerned, may lead to a single prevailing theory—a broad 
view and focus for research and practice. This context of "paradigm" is much 
broader than that used by some researchers when they refer to a particular 
model or algorithm used in research data analysis. 
Nevertheless, the exposition on paradigms herein suffers from the limita-
tion of this author's and others' perceptions of the world of audits. Specifically, 
perceptions of audit theory paradigms are influenced by existing literature and 
* I gratefully acknowledge the contributions and insights provided in the reviews and comments by 
my colleagues Kermit Larson, Urton Anderson, William Kinney, Michael Granof, and Chitoshi 
Koga. 
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thought that begin with a focus on financial statement audits. This biases our 
"world view" in the direction of quantifiable assertions instead of more 
subjective subject matter and toward the audit report output instead of the 
audit process. Anderson [1983] put these biases in focus when he explained the 
context of internal audit department peer review in terms of being similar to, 
but more than, an audit. Many theorists infer that a general definition of 
auditing (e.g., ASOBAC, 1972) can be stretched to encompass all manner of 
assertions, but Anderson maintains that differences in purpose and subject 
matter distinguish peer reviews from other activities that are considered 
"auditing." Indeed, Anderson characterizes most audit theory as being based 
on "the financial audit paradigm." 
Theory and Theory Acceptance 
An accumulation of literature, thought, and practice has not yet led to the 
acceptance of a unique audit paradigm. The search continues for a compelling 
basis for (a) specifying the activities that collectively constitute "auditing," and 
(b) resolving controversies about audit activities. Auditors are not alone in this 
regard. Our brethren in financial accounting have already reached this conclu-
sion about the content of external financial reports [Committee on Concepts 
and Standards for External Financial Reports, 1977]. In both cases, one is 
tempted to conclude that even the possibility of an acceptable normative theory 
is denied. Perhaps the possibility of an acceptable positive theory is likewise 
denied. 
Even if a generally accepted audit theory were proclaimed by a duly 
constituted committee, the search for a "better theory" no doubt would 
continue. No matter what issues someone apparently resolves, someone else 
will raise a case or counter-example to show that the resolution does not work. 
Such is the fate of modern social science. Consider a "theory of materiality'' as 
an example—one that applies equally to both accounting and auditing. People 
have struggled with it for a long time, finally pronouncing this truism [FASB, 
1980, paragraph 132; Leslie, 1985, paragraphs 2-9]: "The omission or 
misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in the light of 
surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable 
that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would have 
been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.'' This 
statement does not appear to be a sufficient product for a theory of materiality. 
Yet, some would argue: "That's as good as it gets. Practitioners and 
researchers/theorists just need to grapple with materiality in each and every 
case, depending on the facts and circumstances." 
Turning to auditing, the search for a generally accepted audit theory 
appears to be equally difficult and unsatisfying. Nevertheless, the benefits to 
practice and research may be in the journey, not at the final destination. 
Role of Theory 
An audit theory paradigm—a perceptive "world view"—should first enable 
people to recognize "audit phenomena." Audit theory should then facilitate 
description, explanation, and prediction of these phenomena in research and 
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professional practice. Such a theory might possess elements both of positive 
theory and of normative theory. 
However, an anonymous commentator (not an auditor) raised this issue: 
The meaning of "audit phenomena" is not clear to me, therefore I do not 
understand what is meant by "audit theory." In light of this kind of comment, 
one must try to capture at least the rudiments of a paradigm in a concept or 
definition that differentiates audit phenomena from other phenomena. The most 
general definition appears to be this: "Auditing is a human evaluation process 
to establish the adherence to certain norms, resulting in an opinion or 
judgment" [Schandl, 1978]. The central features of this definition are (a) 
human judgment process, and (b) norms. With this beginning, "auditing 
phenomena" can at least be distinguished from such things as physics, 
pharmacy, and singing (although not from the truly "auditory" process of 
judging singing performances). It is no surprise that the Committee on Basic 
Auditing Concepts [1972] sought to express a definition that would narrow the 
field of "audit phenomena," producing a definition that relied heavily on 
"assertions about economic actions and events" and "communication of the 
results of evidence evaluation to interested users," thus adding to the central 
features (c) emphasis on economic data, and (d) communication. 
Even though these definitions may be widely accepted, in whole or in part, 
they are clearly not sufficient to lead everyone to a common paradigm or a 
generally accepted theory of auditing. While many people have little trouble 
recognizing most "audit phenomena," people still look to different empirical 
domains for evidence, and they frequently apply differing tests, standards, and 
research methods. Something is missing. Too many auditors lament the lack of 
theory to go unacknowledged. (See the Appendix for a sample of theory 
complaints.) However, most of these complaints can be traced not to differing 
paradigm starting places—the audit phenomena—but to desires for theory 
closure within an audit paradigm. 
Theory Closure 
Whenever people agree on a theory, the agreement is always achieved 
within the social context of the time, accommodating the then-current 
perceptions of cost and benefit, technology, and socio-political factors. Times 
change and so does knowledge of the field. The history of science is replete 
with discarded theories, most of which deserved to be discredited and tossed 
by the wayside. When they were overthrown, new directions took their place. 
So it is with audit theory. Conformity with a single world view that presents 
a complete identification of all possible audit phenomena, a complete enumera-
tion of empirical domains, and a complete inventory of research tests and 
standards has not been accomplished. In fact, it may not be desirable. 
Pretending to achieve such closure would invite intellectual and practical 
stagnation. While complaints about audit theory (Appendix) may be astute or 
ignorant, objective or self-serving, on point or off target, or some other 
characterization depending on one's own paradigm, they are all nonetheless 
expressions of "demand" for audit theory to provide the comfort of a rational 
basis for research and practice activity. 
Theories die a long, slow, and painful death. Their decline is asymptotic— 
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seldom reaching complete extinction. For example, part of the audit theory 
extant eighty or more years ago described audits in terms of their fraud-
detection purpose and activity. This fraud detection view of the world was later 
suppressed in the auditing literature for several decades, and now it seems to 
be rising to prominence again. As theory elements fall into decline, they are 
accompanied by the people who accepted a particular paradigm. Even so, the 
people and their theories can never be completely discarded. As quoted from 
Kuhn by the Committee on Concepts and Standards for External Financial 
Reports [1977]: 
Still more men, convinced of the new view's fruitfulness, will adopt 
the new mode of practicing normal science, until at last only a few 
elderly holdouts remain. And even they, we cannot say, are wrong 
[Kuhn, 1970, p. 159]. 
While a diversity of theories is welcome for the development of the field, 
proponents should not denigrate prior theoretical efforts. The "elderly 
holdouts" have no doubt contributed a platform for the new theorists (next 
elderly holdouts), and their contribution should be honored. After all, they may 
turn out to have been "right" in the first place. Perhaps the "elderly 
holdouts" for a fraud detection tint to the audit world view will yet turn out to 
be "right." 
Paradigm Candidates 
Very few titles make pretensions to a general theory of auditing, so the 
search for paradigm candidates included a perusal of research, symposium 
presentations, and other sources. In numerous cases, authors presented some 
aspects of audit theory without attempting to knit an analysis into a whole fabric 
of auditing. An example is Toba's " A General Theory of Evidence as the 
Conceptual Foundation in Auditing Theory" [1975]. His theory of evidence, as 
presented, is not comprehensive enough to qualify as a paradigm candidate. 
Others are more amenable to conceptual expansion, as will be shown later. 
Another noticeable aspect of theory presentations is the authors' tendency 
to comment upon a very narrow band of audit interests without trying to 
comprehend the breadth of audit issues and problems. In contrast to writings 
about general theory (herein dubbed "macrotheory" signifying a comprehen-
sive treatment of auditing), these authors dealt with "microtheory"—a 
concern with a model or theory of some particular decision problem set in an 
audit context. Examples abound in research reviews such as Felix and Kinney 
[1982] and Scott [1984]. 
The paradigm candidates which follow are the ones perceived to be 
amenable to some degree of generalization to a "theory of auditing." A theory 
ought to be broad enough to encompass a wide range of audit phenomena from 
auditor characteristics like competence and independence, to field work tasks 
of evidence-gathering and decision-making, thence to communication. The 
challenge is to determine to what extent the paradigm candidates differ, if at all, 
in the central characteristics of a paradigm—specification of problems of 
interest, empirical data domains, and research method tests and standards. 
The beginning point is the classic Mautz and Sharaf Philosophy of Auditing 
[1961]. 
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The Inductive Theory of Audit Professionalism 
The theoretical core of the Philosophy of Auditing is the organization of 
concepts and postulates. Mautz and Sharaf presented inductions about auditor 
qualities, field work, and dependence on accounting principles. In abridged 
form, their theory structure, which is embedded in their postulate statements, 
is: 
Auditor Qualities 
Concepts: Ethical conduct 
Independence 
Due audit care 
Postulates: There is no necessary conflict of interest with management. 
The auditor acts exclusively in the capacity of auditor. 
Professional status imposes professional obligations. 
Technical Aspects of Audit Work 
Concepts: Due audit care 
Evidence 
Postulates: Financial statements are verifiable. 
Financial statements are free from collusive and other un-
usual irregularities. 
Internal control eliminates the probability of irregularities. 
The past will hold true for the future. 
Communication 
Concept: 
Postulate: 
Fair presentation 
Consistent application of GAAP results in fair presentation. 
Their theory was inductive—based on their observations of audit practice. 
For all practical purposes, part of this observation involved cognizance of the 
official auditing standards. Indeed, even though the ten audit standards already 
existed, they can be shown to "flow from" the concepts and postulates. They 
can even be perceived as the precepts Mautz and Sharaf said they did not have 
time to pursue [1961, p. 246]. The Mautz and Sharaf theory formulation is a 
product of practice leading theory—which is not a condemnation, because 
theory must get a start somewhere. 
Every theory is forever subject to examination and reformulation, and the 
Mautz and Sharaf theory is no exception. It was produced during a period of 
relative calm in the practicing profession before many other political, social, and 
economic events wrought change in the practice of auditing in the United 
States. In the light of such events, even a friend of the theory could not 
reproduce as explanations to students two of the basic assumptions (postu-
lates), namely: "There is no necessary conflict of interest between the auditor 
and the management of the enterprise under audit," and "The financial 
statements and other information submitted for verification are free from 
collusive and other unusual irregularities." A textbook chapter on auditing 
theory and standards changed the former postulate to: " A potential conflict of 
interest always exists between the auditor and the management of the 
enterprise . . . , " and the latter postulate was omitted entirely [Robertson, 
1979]. These alterations were also inductions. 
The important issue is not so much the endurance of the Mautz and Sharaf 
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formulation but whether it constitutes a paradigm supporting a useful theory of 
auditing, enabling people to generate research hypotheses and describe, 
explain, and predict audit phenomena. It has indeed been useful as a theory 
structure, but it has also failed in some respects. 
Numerous identifications of problems of interest have sprung from the 
Mautz and Sharaf theory. Many, but certainly not all, research projects can be 
traced to its roots regardless of whether the researchers acknowledged them 
[Robertson, 1984]. One should not be surprised about the facility of the theory 
to point to problems of auditing. After all, it was derived by induction from audit 
practice. Nevertheless, it was induced from observations of external audit 
practice and independent audits of financial statements—producing the bias 
toward the "financial audit paradigm." The Mautz and Sharaf theory is much 
more strained to produce identifications of problems in governmental and 
internal auditing. One can see clearly the differences and similarities in the 
management audit and performance audit definitions and objectives presented 
by Herbert [1979]. 
A great deal can be inferred from the Mautz and Sharaf theory about the 
empirical domain over which audit work and research can be applied. Various 
postulates touch the areas of auditor characteristics (e.g., independence, 
professionalism), field work (e.g., evidence-gathering, prediction), and report-
ing relative to generally accepted accounting principles. One area not empha-
sized is the economic and social forces that create demand and supply of audits. 
Mautz and Sharaf took the demand for, and the existence of, auditors largely 
for granted. 
Very little can be seen in the theory about research models and methods or 
about tests and standards, although a good deal is said about practitioners' 
work. Mautz and Sharaf apparently did not write the Philosophy with a primary 
purpose of directing academic and practical research methods. Thus, as a 
broad paradigm, Mautz and Sharaf's formulation is not complete. As shall be 
seen later, other theory statements have more to say about models and 
methods, taking the identification of audit phenomena for granted. 
Process Theory of Audits 
Schandl attempted to integrate into one system the findings of semantic 
philosophy, communication theory, and the psychology of thinking and to apply 
them to the judgment (opinion formulation) process in auditing [1978, p. ix]. 
Although published in 1978, Schandl's papers were available to members of the 
AAA Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts before its report (ASOBAC—A 
Statement on Basic Auditing Concepts) was issued in 1972. The two streams of 
thought have some points in common. They both presented broad definitions of 
auditing, purporting to encompass a wide variety of judgment activities. As 
mentioned earlier, the ASOBAC definition narrowed the field that Schandl 
opened wide. They both paid considerable attention to the investigative 
process. They brought into clear focus the importance of assertions as the 
begirining problem-recognition facet of audit decision-making. 
Schandl also proposed a system of postulates—propositions which he took 
as self-evident. Briefly, his postulates were: 
Purpose: Each audit has a purpose. 
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Judgment (opinion): Audit problems lead to decision conclusions. 
Evidence: Evidence is required in the decision-making process. 
Norms (criteria): Norms are required in the decision-making process. 
Communication: Communication exists and is meaningful. 
The difficulty with Schandl's theory is its level of generality. The postulates 
briefly stated above are not unique to auditing in terms of the independent, 
internal, governmental, operational, and other forms of auditing commonly 
practiced. Collectively, Schandl's postulates constitute the scientific method of 
inquiry developed in philosophy long ago. Significantly, Schandl truncated his 
presentation of postulates, saying: "Their number could be multiplied, as we 
could go deeper and deeper into the analysis of human mind and intellect. But 
we have to leave the rest of the postulates to the disciplines of philosophy and 
psychology.'' He left the theory of auditing at a macro level, and therein lies the 
source of complaint for many researchers who have followed. They have 
lamented the lack of theory, not about auditing, but about the applications of 
philosophy and (particularly) psychology in auditing. These are found "deeper 
and deeper in the analysis of human mind and intellect," to use Schandl's 
words. 
Schandl's formulation appears to be too general to serve well as the theory 
flowing from an audit paradigm. One can use it to specify problems of interest 
in many investigative fields, not only those widely acknowledged as auditing. 
Along with mice in the vents and corpses in the lane, he illustrated audit 
phenomena, but extracting the audit content from the generality is tedious 
through his 212 pages. In the interest of efficiency, despite Schandl's disputes 
about differences, one can study ASOBAC and derive the spirit of the 
investigative process and the science of decision-making and obtain the 
incremental contribution to audit thought. 
However, both Schandl and ASOBAC expanded the details of the empirical 
domain relevant in audits. They carved the place for assertions, norms 
(accepted criteria), and communication much more finely than did Mautz and 
Sharaf. They indeed added elements to the extant audit theory. Both works 
provided auditors/researchers more focus on the essential elements of audit 
decision-making that have now become embedded in AICPA and IIA auditing 
standards statements. 
Neither Schandl nor ASOBAC had enough to say about "microtheory"— 
the level of concern with models and methods, tests and standards for 
particular audit decisions. (Notwithstanding Schandl's explanation of psycho-
logical schema and recognition of the role of clues (similar to "cues") in 
connection with the psychology of information [1978, pp. 38-55].) As a 
complete paradigm, Schandl appears to fall short on this dimension, and 
ASOBAC never pretended to contribute beyond the definitional/investigative 
process element. 
Decision Theory View of Auditing and a Note on Game Theory 
It may be an injustice to other authors to attribute a decision theory view of 
auditing to one, but with apologies to others, Felix [1974] presented such a 
view. Since it was in a brief paper, perhaps it should be called a "glimpse" 
instead of a "view"—certainly not a full-blown theory statement. A decision 
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theory view is more like a perspective on auditing and audit theory than a 
theory in its own right, but it has a significant contribution to offer. 
In terms of a paradigm, decision theory has no global pretensions, at least 
not as presented by Felix. His presentation focused on applications in field 
work. Therefore, one will find no broad ability to specify the wide variety of 
problems of interest in auditing. Not much, if anything, is inferred about 
professionalism (e.g., independence, social responsibility) nor about communi-
cation in the context of information content for users. 
The significant contributions of the decision theory "glimpse" are the 
expansion of the specifics of the empirical domain and the exposure of the 
family of models, methods, tests, and standards which can be applied in audit 
work and research. The domain is expanded with explicit recognition of 
alternative actions, their monetary or utility payoffs, and the probabilities 
(uncertainties) associated with them. Decision theory brings the economics of 
auditing into focus, although it usually leaves hard-to-quantify considerations 
(e.g., professionalism) as an afterthought. Conceptually, however, the entire 
scope of audit problems could be treated in a decision theory framework. 
Game theory applications in auditing make contributions similar to, though 
potentially richer, than decision theory. The potential is realized in the 
recognition of the persona of the game players compared to the decision-
theoretic game against passive nature [Fellingham and Newman, 1985]. While 
game-behavioral influences of auditors upon auditees, and vice versa, are not 
new, the formality of the game theoretic algorithm lends an elegance to thought 
and research. Like decision theory, however, the game theory/strategic view 
of auditing makes its major contribution in the areas of the empirical domain 
with explicit recognition of alternative actions, interactions, payoffs, and 
probabilities, and in the utilization of a particular algorithm. The game theoretic 
algorithm, like single-person decision theory, brings the economics of auditing 
into focus at the apparent sacrifice of professionalism considerations. However, 
one must rely upon other expressions of audit theory to identify the audit 
phenomena to which game theory might be applied. Decision theory and game 
theory do not identify these phenomena. They accept them as subjects for 
attention. 
Social Mechanism Theory of Auditing 
Scott's [1984] paper on the state-of-the-art of academic research in auditing 
did not actually present an audit theory. Nevertheless, he alluded to "an 
explosion in the theory of auditing," "major theoretical approaches to 
auditing," the "wide range of relevant theories,'' and the view of the audit as a 
"social mechanism to enhance the process of contracting, thereby improving 
the operation of securities and managerial labor markets." Actually, the "social 
mechanism theory" amounts to acceptance of the basic reason audits are 
demanded. In Scott's words: 
Society's interests will be served if audits are efficient, in the sense 
of being available at least cost, and effective, in the sense of supplying 
relevant, credible information. Concern over efficiency looms large in 
the auditing literature. Formal concern over effectiveness is more 
recent, primarily because of the complexity of the topic [Scott, 1984, p. 
153]. 
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Scott was not the first to mention audits in the same breath as economics, 
efficiency, and effectiveness. (He was just more elegant with the "social 
mechanism" words.) Elsewhere, the demand for audits has been said to flow 
from the maxim of economic efficacy: "Audited information is more useful than 
unaudited information'' [Robertson, 1984]. Wallace also described auditing as 
an economic service and offered several explanations for the demand for 
auditing (agency theory—the stewardship (monitoring) hypothesis, the infor-
mation hypothesis, and the insurance hypothesis), as well as observations 
about costs and benefits and the incentives for supplying audits [Wallace, 
1980]. 
Scott's mention of a "social mechanism theory," however, was not an 
expression of an audit theory. He was setting the stage for a review of 
research. The studies he proceeded to review dealt with other theories and 
other models applied in an audit context—statistical sampling theory, Bayesian 
decision theory, single-person decision theory, Brunswick lens model, and 
others. The point is that Scott, like others, related audit theory to the 
"microtheory" applications of various models and methods and their attendant 
empirical domains. He appears to have accepted a version of "macrotheory"— 
audit theory—that had already identified the important audit phenomena. 
Notwithstanding the narrow focus of most of the studies he reviewed, Scott 
raised a "macrotheory" question at the end: "The basic theoretical question 
. . . is the extent to which firms' information production decisions should be 
regulated." As a normative matter, this issue may or may not be within the 
orbit of an appropriate audit theory paradigm. After all, not everything can be 
comprehended within "auditing." As a social endeavor, auditing is affected, if 
not controlled, by other forces represented by political science, sociology, 
macroeconomics, and others. At some point, the outer boundary of the audit 
paradigm, and, hence, of audit theory must be drawn. Given this normative 
boundary issue, theorists ought to determine whether the normative question 
of information regulation is a matter for comprehension within an audit theory 
paradigm or a matter of public policy outside the orbit of auditing. 
"Macrotheory" vs. "Microtheory" 
People can debate the usefulness of audit theory for practice, echoing an 
earlier refrain: "Auditing is a series of practices and procedures, methods and 
techniques, a way of doing, with little need for the explanations, descriptions, 
reconciliations, and arguments so frequently lumped together as 'theory' " 
[Mautz and Sharaf, 1961, p. 1], The debate and the productive activity of 
practice and research has proceeded and no doubt will continue to proceed on 
two levels. 
One is a global or all-encompassing "macrotheory" level that is very useful 
for identifying the important/interesting issues for audit practice. This level 
enables practitioners to have more than an ad hoc basis for various social-
economic and professional interactions (e.g., expansion of attestation standards 
to representations other than financial statements, provision of consulting and 
operational auditing services for external audit clients, performance of police/ 
detection work by internal auditors, interaction of public policy considerations 
with program evaluation by governmental auditors). It has little or nothing to 
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say about practice/research models, methods, tests, and standards. Mac-
rotheory (e.g, Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Schandl, 1978; ASOBAC, 1972) 
provides important insights for an audit theory paradigm. 
The other level is the more practical "microtheory" that usually is 
presented as models, methods, and explanations dealing with audit field work 
activity. This may be called the "applied" area, and it seems that much audit 
research and theory development is concentrated in it. Ashton [1981] ex-
plained the high interest in applied research (high potential for short-run 
payoffs, support for the status quo) as a direct function of the fact that the 
largest sources of research funds and resources are from practicing organiza-
tions—accounting firms and professional associations—whose goals are applica-
tion-oriented. Hence, KPMG Peat Marwick [1987] reports that fifty-nine 
percent of its Research Opportunities in Auditing (ROA) projects had prospec-
tive implementation in five years or less. Perusal of research descriptions in the 
ROA reports shows an applied/practical bias in projects whose implementation 
may be considered beyond the five-year horizon. The theory associated with 
the applied/micro level tends to be expressed as the "theory of X in an audit 
context," where X can be statistics, behavioralism, strategic games, and the 
like. 
This concern with "microtheory" and explanations of field work decision 
processes permeates audit research—in search of "theories" that explain or 
improve on-the-job techniques and behaviors. The more recent laments about 
lack of theory almost always refer to a particular area of concern for applications 
in auditing, not for auditing as a broad discipline. 
Further reflection sheds more light on the state of audit theory and the 
paradigm power of "macrotheory." The global theories (e.g., Mautz and 
Sharaf taken as a whole) are theories of auditing that set broad parameters for 
the field. They can help in many ways to channel the direction of auditing 
scholarship. Nevertheless, they are not complete paradigms because they do 
not attempt to specify empirical domains very precisely, nor do they have 
much, if anything, to say about research models, methods, tests and stand-
ards. Macrotheory sets the stage for auditing, and thus for audit research, but 
it does not specify how applied research can be guided and executed. 
Microtheory, on the other hand, appears to be most concerned with a more 
operational, practical level. Practitioners and researchers want to discern 
underlying theory for applications in auditing. Hence, applied research and 
development work starts with theory development such as applications of 
statistics in auditing, behavioral theory in auditing, decision theory in auditing, 
game theory applied in auditing, and so forth. 
All audit theories, both macrotheories and microtheories, suffer from the 
frailties of construction by induction and observation of practice. Mautz and 
Sharaf freely admitted their reliance on observations of practice. Other 
theoretical points of view, such as decision theory applied in auditing, may start 
with a normative model, but then people observe the anomalies and try to 
speculate about (a) altering the model to fit observations, or (b) indoctrinating 
the auditors to change their decision approaches to fit the model. The former 
action—altering the model—represents a beginning in normative science but a 
default to induction. No amount of induction can tell people what auditing should 
be. Such conclusions are normative matters that quickly interfere with the 
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larger worlds of public policy (politics), economics (practitioners' and com-
panies' profit motives), and sociology (user perceptions and demands). 
Audit theory, having its anchor in the practice of auditing, will probably 
always experience wide swings from times when global concerns are highly 
important to times when field applications recapture theoretical attention. The 
primary impediment to developing an audit theory paradigm, complete at all 
levels, is the fact that auditing arises only by human action. It has no 
independent existence in physical nature like gravity and friction. Hence, 
prescriptions (normative theory) about audit purposes and field activities will 
continue to be difficult, if not impossible to "prove," and certainly will be 
disputed by others' differing prescriptions. 
The "macrotheory" and microtheory" spheres of interest can coexist, and 
both can be very useful for scholarship, empirical research, practice, and audit 
policy. It may be that the current state of audit theory is that the "macrotheo-
ries" provide much of the identification of relevant audit phenomena, while the 
"microtheories" provide most of the views of empirical domains and research 
tests and standards. Taken together, they constitute the present state of the 
audit theory paradigm. 
Appendix 
Theory Complaints 
Currently, there is very little available in the professional literature that can be described as 
auditing theory [Mautz and Sharaf, 1961]. 
In their Philosophy of Auditing, Mautz and Sharaf attempt the development of a theory of 
auditing. Regrettably, this work has not produced the scholarly inquiry which the authors hoped 
would follow from it [Anderson, Giese, and Booker, 1970]. 
Events since 1969 have shown the need for a comprehensive theory of auditing, including the 
philosophical and psychological foundations. . . . In no other discipline can we find less literature in 
the last 150 years than in the field of auditing [Schandl, 1978]. 
Someone looking to the recorded auditing research should notice that a complete, logical and 
empirically defensible theory that explains the auditor's existence in an economy is not present. 
The necessary conditions for a solution to all auditing problems have not been established in a 
theoretical structure which is shown to be consistent with the data from the world around us 
[Hamilton, 1978]. 
Accountants and auditors . . . have for their work, as yet, no generally accepted conceptual 
framework or foundation by reference to which agreed objectives can be established and ordered, 
and progress towards them monitored [Kitchen, 1982]. 
Although interest in auditing research has increased substantially over the last ten years, no 
audit theory has been developed to support a coherent research effort. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) 
and Schandl (1978) developed theories of auditing, but their works provided little assistance in 
directing auditing research. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (1976) in Research Opportunities in 
Auditing identified critical auditing areas for future research but gave no overall organizing theme 
[Bamber and Bylinski, 1982]. 
Auditing is not yet at the point where it can be conceptualized in terms of a unified theory 
[Scott, 1984]. 
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